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Marine Archaeology and the International Law of
the Sea
by BERNARD H. OXMAN*
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to examine the rules of the interna-
tional law of the sea relevant to marine archaeology. It does not con-
tain a detailed examination of other rules that, in the end, may be
more important to those interested in marine archaeology.
The law of marine archaeology is primarily the law of a particular
state' regarding the conduct of marine archaeology and the resultant
property interests in anything that may be found. It is what interna-
tional lawyers commonly call "municipal law." Studies of the differ-
ent rules regarding marine archaeology applicable in different juris-
dictions would be part of the larger discipline of comparative law.
International law-some might say public international
law-determines the limits of the jurisdiction of a state to make and
enforce rules regarding marine archaeology, and the duties of states
to each other regarding the manner in which they exercise their ju-
risdiction. Three particular questions are relevant in this regard:
(1) What is the power of a state to determine title to and disposi-
tion of objects of archaeological interest found at sea?
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. The author served as U.S. Repre-
sentative and Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea and Chairman of the English Language Group of the Conference
Drafting Committee. In that capacity, he participated in the negotiation of the provisions of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relevant to marine archaeology. The
views expressed herein are his own. Copyright © Bernard H. Oxman 1988.
1. In the context of international law, the term "state" is used in its international sense
and refers, for example, to the United States rather than to its constituent states which, for
these purposes, are regarded as political subdivisions. Limits on the power of a federal state
as a whole under international law also limit the power of its political subdivisions in an inter-
national context. Whether these limits apply to the power of political subdivisions with re-
spect to each other or to the federal government in a domestic context is determined by
municipal constitutional law which may, on occasion, rely on international law rules. Com-
pare United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965) (Territorial Sea Convention rules are
used to determine the baselines from which the limits of state jurisdiction are measured
under the Submerged Lands Act) with Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (a state of the
United States need not be accorded sovereign immunity in the courts of another state of the
United States in an action for damages arising out of an automobile accident).
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(2) What are the duties of a state regarding the disposition of ob-
jects of archaeological interest found at sea?
(3) What is the power of a state to regulate the conduct of marine
archaeology?
The first question has two aspects. One concerns the power of a
state over objects found or brought within its territory, including its
territorial sea. The other concerns the power of a state over objects
located at sea beyond its territorial sea. While perhaps less exotic, the
former is presumably the more important question: sooner or later,
objects removed from the sea will be brought into the territory of a
state.
There is little doubt that every state has jurisdiction to determine
title to and disposition of property within its territory. In accordance
with its choice of law (private international law) rules, the courts of a
state will normally respect claims of title to personal property (mov-
ables) based on the laws of another state that had jurisdiction to con-
fer such title. Absent a treaty governing the matter, the extent of a
state's obligation to respect such claims of title under international
law is, however, unclear. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the first state
to confer title may itself be in dispute.2
Marine archaeology outside the territory of a state seems to be
conducted on the assumption that widely accepted rules of admiralty
apply to archaeological objects found at sea, and that these rules,
whether derived from the law of salvage or the law of finds, generally
vest title in the person who first reduces the objects to possession.
Many questions are left unanswered by this assumption. Foremost
among them is: Under whose law does title vest? This fertile field for
speculation is, happily, beyond the scope of this article. Two words of
caution, however, must be noted. The first is that the expansion of
various forms of coastal state jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea
may implicate not only the power to regulate marine archaeological
activities but, indirectly, the power to determine title to the objects
found. The second is that the efforts of so-called states of origin to
establish some sort of a priori right to cultural artifacts under interna-
tional law has a direct bearing on the issue of title.
The latter point is linked to the second question regarding the du-
2. Even if private title derived from the laws of another state is recognized, every state is
competent to take private property within its territory for a public purpose, provided it com-
pensates the owner to the extent required by international law. In the case of archaeological
objects, the "public purpose" requirement will normally raise few, if any, questions. The issue
will be requisite compensation, a matter very much in dispute under international law gener-
ally and beyond the scope of this article.
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ties of states with respect to archaeological objects found at sea. Some
duties may be found in the law of the sea itself; those will be ex-
amined more closely in this article. Other duties may derive from
what may be called an emerging conventional and customary law of
cultural artifacts, a body of law not limited to marine archaeology.' It
is in this broader context that the question of a priori rights for so-
called states of origin, questions of treating at least certain cultural
artifacts as the common heritage of all the world and spelling out
what this means in practice, and related questions of identifying and
controlling undesirable international traffic in such objects are gener-
ally addressed. It is likely that, over time, the policies of this emerg-
ing branch of international law will add substance to the jurisdic-
tional framework provided by the law of the sea.
As this brief introduction suggests, one must avoid over-estimating
the role of the international law of the sea in addressing questions of
marine archaeology. The law of the sea is important precisely be-
cause it supplies the jurisdictional framework pursuant to which
states may, individually and cooperatively, develop a substantive law
of marine archaeology. It is also important because its rules may re-
flect insights regarding behavior at sea that would not necessarily ob-
tain on land. But the main burden for deciding what should happen
to an archaeological object found at sea rests with those who have
struggled with the same question regarding such objects found on
land. The difference is that the law of the sea may yield more options
than, and pose problems different from, those that arise from a ter-
restrial system rooted almost exclusively in territorial sovereignty.
I. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The law of the sea was one of the first subjects identified by the
International Law Commission as appropriate for codification and
progressive development. The Commission's efforts resulted in four
Conventions on the Law of the Sea adopted by the 1958 Conference
on the Law of the Sea.' Numerous states, including the United
States, are parties to one or more of these Conventions.
3. See UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Im-
port, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, - U.S.T. -, 823 U.N.T.S.
231 (1972), reprinted in 10 Int'l Legal Materials 289 (1971); UNESCO Convention concern-
ing the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 27 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No.
8226, reprinted in 11 Int'l Legal Materials 1358 (1972); UNESCO Recommendation Con-
cerning the Protection, at a National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heritage, UNESCO
Doc. 17 C/107 (1972), reprinted in 11 Int'l Legal Materials 1367 (1972).
4. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
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After some years of preparation, the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea commenced a comprehensive review
of the subject in 1973, culminating in the 1982 United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea.' Although the number of states that
have already ratified the Convention is not yet sufficient to bring it
into force, 155 states have signed it. Many of the articles relevant to
this study were copied from, or can fairly be regarded as more pre-
cise elaborations upon, the 1958 Conventions. The exclusive eco-
nomic zone, perhaps the most significant innovation of the Conven-
tion, has been widely accepted in state practice. With the notable
exception of deep seabed mining, the provisions of the Convention
were prepared by a system of consensus and appear to be generally
acceptable to both signatories and non-signatories. The United
States, which refused to sign the Convention because of its deep sea-
bed mining provisions, has indicated that its behavior and positions in
other respects will be guided by the Convention. 6
With respect to the issue of marine archaeology, it is reasonable to
proceed on the assumption that the provisions of the 1982 U.N. Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea are generally the best evidence of cur-
rent international law binding on all states. Needless to say, this as-
sumption would be highly controversial with respect to the regulation
of deep seabed mining and the role of the International Seabed Au-
thority, and might be challenged with respect to other specific provi-
sions. This study, however, is not concerned with either the regula-
tion of deep seabed mining or the International Seabed Authority as
such and, with the exception of some specific provisions relevant to
marine archaeology itself, rests upon general rules laid down in the
Convention that seem to be generally accepted.
II. General Jurisdictional Principles
Any discussion of jurisdiction necessarily concentrates on the au-
thority of a state to prohibit or regulate conduct. The existence of
such authority says nothing about the wisdom of exercising it. A state
U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 206; Convention on the Continental Shelf,
Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 312; Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138,
T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 286.
5. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Pub. Sales No.
E.83.V.5 (1983), reprinted in 21 Int'l Legal Materials 1261 (1982) [hereinafter Convention].
6. United States Oceans Policy, Statement by the President, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.
383 (Mar. 10, 1983).
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with jurisdiction over a given person or activity may well be guided
by liberal values in determining its policies concerning the exercise of
such jurisdiction.
Before turning to the jurisdictional rules specific to the interna-
tional law of the sea, it is useful to note that nationality is one of the
recognized bases of a state's jurisdiction under international law. In
principle, a state may regulate the behavior of its nationals wherever
they may be." A state could, if it so chose, prohibit its nationals from
engaging in marine archaeology or impose conditions on such an
activity.
The principle of nationality also applies to ships. A state may regu-
late a ship flying its flag and the activities on board without regard to
the location of the ship. It could, therefore, if it so chose, prohibit
ships flying its flag from engaging in marine archaeology or impose
conditions on such an activity.
The principle of nationality does not, however, mean that the state
of nationality may preclude another state from applying that state's
own limitations on activities subject to its jurisdiction. For example,
either State A or State B may preclude a ship flying the flag of State
A from conducting archaeological activities in the territorial sea of
State B. Furthermore, states are generally free to determine the con-
ditions of access to their ports and the conduct of activities within
their territory. A state could, for instance, prohibit or regulate the
import or export of archaeological objects or the conduct of plan-
ning, logistical and support activities within its territory.
I. The High Seas
The classic regime of the high seas is, as such, largely unchanged
by the 1982 Convention. To the extent that marine archaeology was
previously regarded as a freedom of the high seas, it would continue
to enjoy that status under the high-seas regime set forth in the new
Convention.8
What has been changed by the 1982 Convention is the scope of the
regime of the high seas and the extent to which other regimes, in
coastal areas in particular, limit and qualify the exercise of previous
7. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). See also Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S.
69 (1941).
8. Neither article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 4, nor article
87 of the 1982 Convention, supra note 5, specifically enumerates marine archaeology as a
freedom of the high seas, but the enumerations in both, expressly qualified by the words
inter alia, are clearly not intended to be exhaustive.
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high-seas freedoms. In addition, the Convention contains elaborate
environmental duties and some new provisions that affect marine ar-
chaeology directly.
It should be noted that the freedom of the high seas under interna-
tional law is enjoyed by states. Each state may control the extent to
which it permits its nationals and ships flying its flag to exercise that
freedom.
IV. Areas of Coastal State Sovereignty
The coastal state has sovereignty over internal waters such as rivers
and small bays, as well as a band adjacent to its coast and internal
waters called the territorial sea.' The 1982 Convention specifies that
the maximum permissible breadth of the territorial sea is twelve
miles.10 In addition, the Convention permits independent island
states to exercise sovereignty over waters lying within lines drawn
around the perimeter of certain archipelagoes."
All states enjoy passage rights in many parts of the sea are subject
to coastal state sovereignty; 2 however, other activities in those areas
are generally subject to the control of the coastal state in the exercise
of its sovereignty. The coastal state undoubtedly has the right to reg-
ulate and control marine archaeology in areas subject to its
sovereignty.
The courts of a coastal state are likely, under their choice of law
rules, to apply their own law to determine title to archaeological ob-
jects found within areas subject to the sovereignty of that state.13 The
content of that law, of course, may be influenced by admiralty princi-
ples, including the law of salvage and the law of finds. It is somewhat
less certain, however, that courts of other states, in deciding upon
title at the time of discovery or removal, would also apply the law of
the state in whose waters the object was found. 4
9. Convention, supra note 5, art. 2.
10. Convention, supra note 5, art. 3. The word "miles" in this article refers to nautical
miles.
11. Convention, supra note 5, arts. 46-49.
12. Convention, supra note 5, arts. 8, 17, 38, 45, 52, 53.
13. In a federal state, municipal law would determine the extent to which federal or pro-
vincial (state) law applies.
14. One suspects that the influence of territorial considerations in determining title to
movable property and the influence of admiralty principles in determining title to property
found at sea would be the strongest factors affecting the resolution of the choice of law issue,
absent an authoritative enunciation of policy or claim of title by the political branches of the
forum state itself. With respect to the first of these, see Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 247 illustration 2 (1969).
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V. Specific Provisions on Marine Archaeology
Articles 149 and 303 of the 1982 Convention deal specifically with
marine archaeology. The text of article 149 appeared in the very
first Informal Single Negotiating Text presented to the Conference
in 1975.15 Article 303, in contrast, was not negotiated until late in
the Conference and appeared for the first time in the Draft Conven-
tion (Informal Text) in 1980.16
The extent to which either article reflects actual state practice is
questionable. Marine archaeology was not a central issue at the Con-
ference and did not attract widespread attention from the various
delegations. On the other hand, neither article attracted opposition
at the Conference. This leads to the conclusion that the participating
states found these articles to be generally acceptable or, at the least,
that these states did not perceive difficulties with these articles suffi-
cient to warrant complicating or prolonging the Conference.
A. Article 149
Article 149 provides:
All objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the
Area shall be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a
whole, particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of the
State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of
historical and archaeological origin. 7
This provision appears last in a series of general principles in Part
XI of the Convention that apply to the "Area" defined as "the sea-
bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction."1 8 This "Area" begins at least 200 miles from continen-
tal and insular coasts, and in many places well beyond 200 miles. 9 It
15. Informal Single Negotiating Text, Part I, art. 19, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
WP.8/Part I (1975), reprinted in 14 Int'l Legal Materials 682 (1975). The second and third
paragraphs of article 19 were deleted in the first revision of the text. Revised Single Negoti-
ating Text, Part I, art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.I/Part 1 (1976).
16. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3 at 119 (1980).
17. Convention, supra note 5, art. 149.
18. Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
19. The relevant limit of national jurisdiction is the outer limit of the continental shelf.
Pursuant to article 76, para. 1,
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural pro-
longation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not
extend up to that distance.
1988]
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is a vast and generally deep part of the ocean that was not frequented
by pre-Columbian mariners and is far from the coastal hazards re-
sponsible for many ship wrecks.2"
The extent to which the text of article 149 was negotiated by dele-
gates is unclear. It was prepared in the context of First Committee
negotiations that were primarily concerned with the regulation of
deep seabed mining. Explanations for its inclusion may be rooted in
both tactical desires to deflect more far-reaching proposals and sub-
stantive desires to reinforce the conclusion that marine archaeology
is different from deep seabed mining and that the system for regulat-
ing deep seabed mining does not apply to marine archaeology. Be
that as it may, the result is that salvage and marine archaeology are
not subject to regulation by the International Sea-Bed Authority
under the Convention.21
Article 149 must be read in the context of article 87, which de-
clares the high seas to be open to all states, and the parallel provision
in article 141, which declares the international seabed "Area" to be
open to use by all states "without prejudice to the other provisions
of" Part XI of the Convention.22 Article 149 is the only other provi-
sion that is directly relevant (apart from the general cross-reference
The remainder of article 76 contains detailed rules for determining the outer limit of the
continental shelf where the continental margin extends beyond 200 miles.
Pursuant to article 121, para. 3, "Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or eco-
nomic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf." This
exception is not relevant to the limits of the "Area" to the extent that all or part of the
seabed to which the exception applies is within the limits of the continental shelf measured
from an island or other land territory to which the exception does not apply.
20. Poor navigation, storm and icebergs would seem to be the primary hazards in such a
place; only rarely (and sensationally) have navigators denied the last hazard the respect it is
due.
21. The regulatory competence of the International Sea Bed Authority is linked to "ac-
tivities in the Area," a term defined by article I of the Convention to mean "all activities of
exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area." Article 133 defines "re-
sources" to mean "all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or
beneath the sea-bed, including polymetallic nodules." Neither the text nor the travaux
priparatoires supports the inclusion of sunken ships and their cargo, cultural artifacts, or
marine archaeology within the ambit of these terms.
The original draft of what ultimately became article 149 contained the following second
paragraph: "The recovery and disposal of wrecks and their contents more than 50 years old
found in the Area shall be subject to regulation by the Authority without prejudice to the
rights of the owner thereof." Informal Single Negotiating Text, supra note 15, Part I, art.
19, para. 2. This paragraph was removed in the first revision of the negotiating text. Revised
Single Negotiating Text, supra note 15, Part I, art. 19. The definition of the term "activities
in the Area" found in article I of the Convention appeared for the first time in the same
revision of the negotiating text. Id.
22. Convention, supra note 5, arts. 87, 141. Article 87 expressly includes the construction
of installations among the freedoms of the high seas.
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to other rules of international law in article 138). It would therefore
appear that previous high-seas law continues unchanged with respect
to marine archaeology in the "Area" except to the extent that it is
altered by article 149.'3
Article 149 belongs to a thriving species of text that codifies rather
than resolves an underlying policy dispute.2 An underlying tension
in debates over the disposition of cultural artifacts is between univer-
salist tendencies (the benefit of humanity as a whole) and nationalist
tendencies (the preferential rights of so-called states of origin). Arti-
cle 149 offers no guidance as to how to accommodate the conflicting
policy goals it enunciates (much less as to what disposition of the arti-
facts will promote the benefit of all humanity)25 which state is to be
regarded as a state of origin with respect to an object whose origin
antedates the modern nation-state system and contemporary
demographics, what is the nature of the preferential rights of the
state of origin, or what constitutes due regard to such rights.
Because the 1982 Convention contains broad compulsory dispute-
settlement provisions, it is worth considering whether article 149 is
the kind of text that, in the main, is directed to political rather than
judicial implementation. The text is essentially hortatory. This may
be all to the good, given the absence in article 149 of the kind of
craftsmanship normally found in legal texts purporting to deal with
complex issues of title to property. Indeed, even in negating any ef-
fect on matters of title, paragraph 3 of article 303 is more carefully
crafted than article 149.
The nature of article 149 invites speculation as to the reason for
addressing the issue of marine archaeology at all with respect to pre-
23. Article 136 declares the Area and its resources to be the "common heritage of man-
kind." It is not clear that this applies to wrecks and other man-made artifacts found there. It
is also not clear whether the common-heritage principle, as incorporated into an elaborate
Convention, has legal content apart from that contained in the other requirements of the
Convention. Even if it does, the principle was understood in the context of the Law of the
Sea negotiations as it relates to seabed mining. Its implications with respect to marine archae-
ology would necessarily be quite different, yet there is nothing in the records of the Confer-
ence to suggest that there was any intention to address those implications. In this light, the
absence of an independent reference to the common-heritage principle in article 149 should
be regarded as significant.
24. My colleague, Patrick Gudridge, first invited my attention to the ubiquity of such
texts during a faculty seminar at the University of Miami School of Law.
25. One must bear in mind, for example, that free-market economists and socialist econo-
mists each believe their approach to the allocation of property rights benefits humanity as a
whole. It is a fundamental mistake, and a remarkable indictment of free enterprise, for those
who favor free-market models to conclude that the goal of benefiting all, or the principle of
the common heritage of humanity, necessarily implies a public or socialist economic model.
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cisely the area of the seabed that is least likely to yield significart
cultural artifacts from centuries past. Is it possible that the deep sea-
bed negotiations were merely an occasion for so-called states of ori-
gin to seek to advance general legal positions of no special impor-
tance with respect to the deep seabeds, but of considerable
importance with respect to cultural objects found, or to be found,
elsewhere? Was their effort to incorporate their views into the deep
seabed mining text designed to influence negotiations later in the
Conference over marine archaeology in coastal areas? If so, what is
the legal effect of their failure to incorporate into article 303 the
concepts set forth in article 149?
B. Article 303
Article 303 of the Convention provides:
1. States have the duty to protect objects of an archaeological and
historical nature found at sea and shall co-operate for this purpose.
2. In order to control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may,
in applying article 33, presume that their removal from the sea-bed in
the zone referred to in that articles without its approval would result in
an infringement within its territory or territorial sea of the laws and
regulations referred to in that article.
3. Nothing in this article affects the rights of identifiable owners, the
law of salvage or other rules of admiralty, or laws and practices with
respect to cultural exchanges.
4. This article is without prejudice to other international agreements
and rules of international law regarding the protection of objects of an
archaeological and historical nature."6
Unlike the sweeping conceptual generalities of article 149 that are
directed to conflicting perspectives on issues of title and use, the first
two paragraphs of article 303 are fairly specific, and the third para-
graph expressly negates any effect on rules regarding title.2"
The first paragraph enunciates a duty of protection applicable to
all parts of the sea, including those parts of the seabed to which arti-
cle 149 applies. Its greatest significance is that it applies this duty to
coastal areas subject to the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the coastal
state where important objects are most likely to be found and where
competing uses of the sea and seabed that pose potential threats to
cultural artifacts are likely to be most intense. While the nature of
26. Convention, supra note 5, art. 303.
27. From a negotiating perspective, article 149 and the third paragraph of article 303 can
be viewed as examples of alternative drafting techniques for avoiding resolution of issues in a
treaty text.
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the duty of protection is left open, it is noteworthy that only with
respect to protection of the environment"8 does the Convention in-
troduce a comparably categorical duty applicable everywhere at sea.
The second paragraph of article 33 in effect permits the coastal
state to extend its control over marine archaeology beyond its territo-
rial sea up to 24 miles from the coastal baselines. This provision was
a result of negotiations in response to proposals to establish coastal
state jurisdiction over archaeological and historical objects through-
out the continental shelf.2 9 Critics argued that those proposals were
both unnecessary and objectionable: unnecessary because most ob-
jects are likely to be found close to the coast and objectionable be-
cause the proposed amendments would alter the nature and balance
of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf regimes already
negotiated.
For reasons of principle whose importance transcended any inter-
ests in marine archaeology as such, the maritime powers were unwill-
ing to yield to any further erosions in the freedoms of the seas, par-
ticularly regarding coastal state jurisdiction over non-resource uses
beyond the territorial sea. The inclusion of paragraph 2 of article
303 in the general provisions of the Convention rather than the texts
dealing with jurisdiction, and the indirect drafting style employing
cross-references and presumptions, were intended to emphasize both
the procedural and substantive points that the regimes of coastal
state jurisdiction as elaborated by the Second Committee of the Con-
ference were not being reopened or changed.
It had long been established that the coastal state may control
smuggling in the contiguous zone adjacent to its territorial sea,30 and
it was already agreed at the Conference that the maximum limit of
the contiguous zone would be extended from twelve to twenty-four
miles. In principle, the second paragraph of article 303 adds nothing
28. Convention, supra note 5, art. 192.
29. See Doc. C.2/Informal Meeting/43/Rev.1, reported in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.
42, 8th Sess., Report of the Chairman of the Second Comm. (1979), reprinted in R.
Platz6der, Dokumente der Dritten Seerechtskonferenz der Vereinten Nationen-New York
Session 1979, at 515 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 1979), described in Oxman, The
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Eighth Session (1979), 74 Am.
J. Int'l L. 1, 23 n.79 (1980).
At about the same time, in response to reports of efforts by the United States to recover a
sunken Soviet submarine for intelligence purposes, the Soviet Union and its allies were press-
ing the proposition that sunken ships and aircraft, and equipment and cargo on board, may
be salvaged only with the consent of the flag state. Id.
30. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 4, art.
24.
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to this jurisdictional structure. It does not in any way expand the na-
ture of coastal-state powers in the contiguous zone, but rather per-
mits the coastal state to establish a presumption of smuggling. That
presumption, in the absence of paragraph 2, might be justified by the
facts in many cases but might be difficult to prove in court. By ad-
ding a legal presumption that facilitates the exercise of existing
coastal state powers in the contiguous zone, paragraph 2 augments
those powers only to the extent of the presumption. This is a tech-
nique often used in municipal law to facilitate the administration of
justice. The result is coastal state control, no principle of coastal state
jurisdiction as such, over marine archaeology in the contiguous zone
beyond the territorial sea.
Paragraph 4 of article 303 is intended to harmonize the rules of
the law of the sea regarding marine archaeology with the content of
the emerging law of archaeology and cultural artifacts.
What do we mean by objects of an archaeological or historical na-
ture? The term is not defined in the Convention. There was no refer-
ence during the negotiations to definitions in other contexts. It is im-
portant to bear in mind that whatever the justifications for particular
definitions in the context of other instruments, in the context of the
law of the sea an unduly liberal reading of the term to embrace more
modern wrecks and objects could prejudice certain rights and princi-
ples that states were unwilling to yield in the negotiation of the Con-
vention. For example, the interpretation automatically affects the
scope of coastal state powers in the contiguous zone beyond the terri-
torial sea.
The author, who represented the United States in the negotiation
of article 303 and participated in its drafting, made the following
contemporaneous observations on this point:
The provision is not intended to apply to modern objects whatever
their historical interest. Retention of the adjective "historical" was in-
sisted upon by Tunisian delegates, who felt that it was necessary to
cover Byzantine relics that might be excluded by some interpretations of
the word "archaeological." Hence, the term "historical origin," lacking
at best in elegance, when used with the term "archaeological objects" in
an article that expressly does not affect the law of salvage, does at least
suggest the idea of objects that are many hundreds of years old. [The
word "origin" was subsequently deleted by the Conference Drafting
Committee.]
The article contains no express time limit. As time marches on, so
does our sense of what is old. Nevertheless, given the purpose for using
the term "historical," it may be that if a rule of thumb is useful for
deciding what is unquestionably covered by this article, the most appro-
priate of the years conventionally chosen to represent the start of the
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modern era would be 1453: the fall of Constantinople and the final col-
lapse of the remnants of the Byzantine Empire. Everything older would
clearly be regarded as archaeological or historical. A slight adjustment
to 1492 for application of the article to objects indigenous to the Ameri-
cas, extended perhaps to the fall of Tenochtitlin (1521) or Cuzco (1533)
in those areas, might have the merit of conforming to historical and
cultural classifications in that part of the world."s
VI. The Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf
Beyond the territorial sea, while pursuant to the regimes of the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, all states enjoy
certain high-seas freedoms, the coastal state is permitted to exercise
jurisdiction over some activities.3 ' Both these regimes apply up to
200 miles from the coast; the regime of the continental shelf also
applies to the seabed and subsoil of the continental margin where it
extends seaward of 200 miles."3
The Convention does not establish coastal-state jurisdiction as such
over marine archaeology, wrecks or cultural artifacts in the exclusive
economic zone or on the continental shelf. Nevertheless, the manner
in which marine archaeology is conducted might involve activities,
such as drilling, that are subject to coastal-state jurisdiction.
A. Sovereign Rights with Respect to the Continental Shelf
In its commentary on articles subsequently incorporated into the
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, the International Law
Commission clearly stated that coastal state jurisdiction over the con-
tinental shelf does not extend to wrecks." The relevant texts are re-
peated in the 1982 Convention, and there is nothing added that
would alter the Commission's earlier conclusions on this subject.
31. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Ninth
Session (1980), 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 211, 241 n.152 (1981). Additional comments regarding the
negotiation of article 303 can be found id. at 239-41.
32. The basic provisions are set forth in the Convention, supra note 5, arts. 56, 58, 77.
33. Id. arts. 57, 76. See supra note 18.
34. Referring to the article providing that the "coastal state exercises over the continen-
tal shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources,"
the Commission stated, "It is clearly understood that the rights in question do not cover
objects such as wrecked ships and their cargoes (including bullion) lying on the seabed or
covered by the sand of the subsoil." Report of the International Law Commission, ii U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956). Accord Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The
Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 1978).
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B. Economic Exploration and Exploitation
In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has:
sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserv-
ing and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of
the waters . . . and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the
zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and
winds."
The International Law Commission's interpretation of the article
dealing with the sovereign rights of the coastal state with respect to
natural resources of the continental shelf, 6 from which the first part
of the text quoted above is derived, makes clear that sovereign rights
over the exploration and exploitation of natural resources do not em-
brace wrecks.
If any question is posed by this text, it is posed by the reference to
"other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the
zone." This clause, however, is directed to exploration and exploita-
tion of the zone itself, i.e., the natural features of the zone. The lan-
guage is qualified by the words "such as," which introduce the refer-
ence to the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.
Marine archaeology does not remotely resemble such activities.
There is no suggestion whatever in the travaux priparatoires that this
clause was intended to cover wrecks. In brief, it would not be reason-
able to construe these words as embracing wrecked ships or marine
archaeology.
C. Marine Scientific Research
Resort to abstract classifications might lead to the conclusion that
archaeology is not only a science but scientific research and therefore
that archaeology at sea is marine scientific research. Such conceptual-
ization is not, however, rooted in the text or travaux priparatoires of
the 1982 Convention. The Convention expressly gives the coastal
state the right to authorize and regulate marine scientific research in
the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf. This gen-
eral proposition was settled at the Conference before article 303 was
drafted. What reason would there be to add paragraph 2 of article
303 if marine archaeology were regarded as marine scientific re-
search under the Convention?
35. Convention, supra note 5, art. 56.
36. See supra note 31.
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While the Convention does not define marine scientific research,
the provisions of Part XIII establish that the articles relating to
marine scientific research deal with the search for knowledge about
the natural marine environment or, in the words of article 243,
"phenomena and processes occurring in the marine environment and
the interrelations between them.""7 Were these articles designed to
cover marine archaeology, it would indeed be odd that "samples" are
the only objects retrieved from the sea to which the text refers and
that the text specifically requires identification of "samples which
may be divided without detriment to their scientific value."" 8
D. Freedoms in the Exclusive Economic Zone
Perhaps the most interesting conceptual question is whether a high
seas freedom to hunt for wrecks and artifacts is preserved in the ex-
clusive economic zone. Even if marine archaeology is not made sub-
ject to coastal state jurisdiction as such, is it included in the high seas
freedoms preserved in the exclusive economic zone?




1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or
land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Conven-
tion, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and over-
flight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such
as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and subma-
rine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of
this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law
apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incom-
patible with this Part. 9
37. The question of the meaning of the term "marine scientific research" was examined
by the author at greater length in Oxman, Le Regime des navires de guerre dans le cadre de
la Convention des Nations Unis sur le droit de la mer, 28 Annuaire Frangais de Droit Inter-
national 811, 838 (1982), republished in English as Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 Va. J. Int'l L. 809, 844-47 (1984).
38. Convention, supra note 5, art. 249, para. 1.
39. Id. art. 58, para. 1, 2.
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Article 59
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdic-
tion to the coastal State or to other States within the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, and a conflict arises between the interests of the coastal
State and any other State or States, the conflict should be resolved on
the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances,
taking into account the respective importance of the interests in-






The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not
included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in
the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an
archipelagic State. This article does not entail any abridgement of
the freedoms enjoyed by all States in the exclusive economic zone in
accordance with article 58.41
Not all high seas freedoms are preserved in the exclusive economic
zone; indeed, freedom of fishing is essentially eliminated. But those
freedoms that are preserved by article 58 are high seas freedoms; this
is what is meant by the words "referred to in article 87" in article 58,
paragraph 1, the comprehensive cross-reference in article 58, para-
graph 2 and the reverse cross-reference in the second sentence of
article 86. Article 58, paragraph 2, incorporates by reference all the
non-fisheries provisions of the high seas regime set forth in Part VII,
except for the enumeration of high seas freedoms. These texts do
not refer expressly to marine archaeology.
A right to conduct marine archaeology in the exclusive economic
zone can be rooted in the language of article 58, paragraph 1. That
provision can be read with relative ease to embrace ordinary salvage,
removal of obstructions to navigation, hydrography and a variety of
other activities. Diving is an activity traditionally associated with navi-
gation. As long as the object sought is or was a ship or something
40. Id. art. 59.
41. Id. art. 86.
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found on board a ship, a further relation to navigation may be
established.4
2
Were article 59 to be regarded as the governing provision, each
side of the debate would have to marshall the arguments for and
against the preservation of the traditional high seas freedom. How-
ever, article 59 applies only in cases where the Convention as a whole
does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal state or to
other states within the exclusive economic zone. Article 303, para-
graph 2, expressly attributes rights to the coastal state within waters
forming part of the exclusive economic zone. Thus it would appear
that article 59 should not be read to apply to marine archaeology.
The rational understanding of the 24-mile limit on coastal state pow-
ers under article 303, paragraph 2, is that marine archaeology is pre-
served as a freedom of the high seas beyond that limit.
The conclusion that marine archaeology is preserved as a freedom
of the high seas in that part of the exclusive economic zone seaward
of 24 miles from the coastal baselines is reinforced by the negotiating
history of article 303, paragraph 2. That provision was drafted as a
response to proposals to establish coastal state jurisdiction through-
out the exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.43 The geo-
graphic scope of coastal state control is more restricted under article
303 because some maritime states were unwilling to accept coastal
state control throughout the exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf and, for reasons of substance or accommodation, the propo-
nents of broader control were prepared to accept the 24-mile limit. It
would seem untoward to interpret the very general language of arti-
cles 58 and 59 in a manner that is contradicted by article 303 para-
graph 2, and its negotiating history.
E. Limitations on Marine Archaeology
The Convention contains provisions regarding the exclusive eco-
nomic zone and the continental shelf that may have a very significant
bearing on marine archaeology. At least in some cases their impact
may be so substantial that the coastal state will be in an effective posi-
tion to determine whether, and if so under what conditions, marine
archaeology may occur.
Pursuant to article 81, the coastal state has "the exclusive right to
42. Some might respond that the older the object being sought, the harder it is to estab-
lish that relation.
43. See supra note 26.
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authorize and regulate drilling on the continental shelf for all
purposes."'
In addition, article 60 provides:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the ex-
clusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construc-
tion, operation and use of:
(a) artificial islands;
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in ar-
ticle 56 and other economic purposes;
(c) installations and structures which may interfere with the exer-
cise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone.
2. The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artifi-
cial islands, installations, and structures, including jurisdiction with re-
gard to customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and
regulations. 4"
The conduct of marine archaeology may require the use of installa-
tions or structures within the meaning of article 60. If such installa-
tions or structures are being used for "other economic purposes"
within the meaning of paragraph 1(b), or if they "may interfere with
the exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone" under par-
agraph l(c),'6 then the coastal state has control.
47 Museums, universi-
ties and scientific institutions might be in a good position to avoid
coastal state control under paragraph l(b), but the broad wording of
paragraph 1(c) still affords the coastal state room for argument to the
contrary.
Activities in the exclusive economic zone must be conducted with
"due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State."'
8 This is a
flag state duty rather than a coastal state right. Correctly interpreted,
this provision affords the basis for insisting that the flag state take
reasonable steps to ensure "due regard," but it does not confer juris-
diction on the coastal state to enforce the "due regard" obligation
directly on the foreign ship.
44. Convention, supra note 5, art. 81.
45. Id. art. 60, para. 1, 2.
46. Article 60, paragraph 1(c) was inspired by the reasoning in United States v. Ray, 423
F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970).
47. This control includes the power to adopt and enforce environmental regulations.
Convention, supra note 5, arts. 208, 214.
48. Id. art. 58, para. 3.
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VII. Settlement of Disputes
Many of the issues affecting marine archaeology, including those
raised by articles 149 and 303, would appear to be subject to compul-
sory arbitration or adjudication under the Convention. 9 Thus, one
could imagine the development of precise interpretations of the Con-
vention's rules, leading not only to greater certainty but to the pro-
gressive articulation of practical obligations under the broad duty to
protect archaeological and historical objects found at sea. Neither in-
dividual pieces of national legislation, of necessity limited in geo-
graphic scope, nor sweeping cultural conventions devoid of compul-
sory dispute settlement or other enforcement mechanisms, might
achieve as much in the end.
Even if all of the relevant substantive provisions of the 1982 Con-
vention are reliably regarded as declaratory of existing international
law and therefore binding on parties and non-parties alike, this is not
the case with respect to compulsory arbitration or adjudication. A
state must agree in order to be bound by the obligation to arbitrate
or adjudicate. The current refusal of the United States Government
to consider even a process of negotiation that could end in United
States ratification therefore both discourages the development of this
dispute settlement process and, if continued, might exclude the
United States from the process.
CONCLUSION
The new international law of the sea continues the tradition of the
freedom of the high seas under which marine archaeology may be
freely conducted, but with some significant new limitations.
Those who disfavor the new coastal state limitations would be well
advised to support the rapid entry into force of the 1982 Convention.
It is unlikely that coastal State powers that evolve under customary
international law will be less extensive than those set forth in the
Convention. The likely trend is in the opposite direction. The Con-
vention at least freezes the situation and binds the coastal states to
compulsory arbitration.5"
Those who favor increased regulation of marine archaeology will
find that, coupled with other rules of international law, the new in-
49. Id. arts. 286, 297, 298.
50. The alternative-realized far too often in practice in other contexts-is to pay high
fees to accommodating lawyers who conclude that the coastal state is acting illegally and that
the Secretary of State is a wimp for being unwilling to risk a military base, an oil investment
or a trade war for the sake of protecting the client's project.
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ternational law of the sea provides a more than adequate jurisdic-
tional framework for imposing such limitations on marine archaeol-
ogy as may be desirable. The 1982 Convention significantly adds to
its jurisdictional framework a broad duty to protect archaeological
and historical objects found at sea. The vitality of this system could
be significantly enhanced by entry into force of the Convention, par-
ticularly in light of its compulsory dispute settlement provisions.
The law of the sea will not, however, resolve some of the most
fundamental issues that face archaeology and the law of cultural arti-
facts generally. As articles 149 and 303 of the Convention demon-
strate, these issues can be resolved only by those more expert in me-
diating the underlying economic, aesthetic, intellectual and political
values asserted.
It remains to be seen whether the result will encourage marine ar-
chaeology and treat all peoples as the common cultural descendants
of ancient civilizations, drinking from a single well of human wisdom
and achievement, or will reveal modern states still to be little more
than prehistoric tribes, hiding their wealth and squabbling over title
to icons and watering holes.
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